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Abstract 
This article analyses how social movements and collective actors can affect political and 
social transformation in a structurally violent society using the case study of Northern 
Ireland. We focus, in particular, on the crucial role played by collective actors within the 
loyalist community (those who wish to maintain Northern Ireland’s place in the UK), in 
bringing about social and political transformation in a society blighted by direct, cultural, and 
structural violence both during the conflict and subsequent peace process. Drawing on data 
obtained through in-depth interviews with loyalist activists (including former paramilitaries), 
the article demonstrates the role and impact of loyalists and loyalism in Northern Ireland’s 
transition. We identify five conflict transformation challenges addressed by loyalist actors in 
a structurally violent society: de-mythologizing the conflict; stopping direct violence; 
resisting pressure to maintain the use of violence; development of robust activist identity; and 
the measurement of progress through reference to the parallel conflict transformation journey 
of their former republican enemies. The Northern Ireland case demonstrates the necessity for 
holistic conflict transformation strategies which attempt not only to stop direct attacks, but 
also the cultural and structural violence which underpin and legitimize them. In so doing, the 
article contributes to a broader understanding of how and why paramilitary campaigns are 
brought to an end. 
  
Keywords: structural violence; peace processes; social movements; Northern Ireland; 
terrorism; deradicalization 
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Social movements, structural violence and conflict transformation: the case of Northern 
Ireland 
In 1998, political leaders and paramilitary groups, backed by the British and Irish 
governments, signed a peace agreement which signalled the end of thirty years of violence in 
Northern Ireland (Tonge, 2002). The conflict involved three sides: militant republican 
paramilitaries (groups pursuing a united Ireland by force of arms, drawn overwhelmingly 
from the Irish ‘Catholic community’); the British State represented by the British Army, the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the local militia (The Ulster Defence Regiment later 
merged into the Royal Irish Regiment); and loyalist paramilitary groups, committed to 
maintaining Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom (whose numbers draw primarily 
from the Ulster ‘Protestant community’).  
To date, much scholarly work has been written about the elite politics of Northern 
Ireland’s journey from conflict to peace (Hennessey, 2000; Tonge, 2002); the inner-workings 
of the paramilitary groups (English, 2003; McDonald & Cusack, 2004; Rekawek, 2011); and 
the role of external actors in facilitating the peace process (Clancy, 2010). Within this body 
of scholarship, the role of loyalists has been analysed from a number of perspectives. The 
bulk of this work has taken the form of historical analysis, or work by journalists, pertaining 
to loyalist paramilitary violence (see e.g. Cusack & McDonald, 1997; McAuley, 2010; 
McDonald & Cusack, 2004). The cultural politics of loyalism has also received attention, 
including membership surveys of Protestant religious organisations such as the Orange Order 
(McAuley, Tonge, & Mycock, 2011). More recently, the contribution of former loyalist 
prisoners to the post-conflict dispensation has also been examined (Shirlow, Tonge, McAuley 
& McGlynn, 2010; Smithey, 2011). However, the role played by loyalist collective action in 
social transformation in Northern Ireland remains neglected and understudied.   
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Loyalist paramilitary groups were a working class Protestant response to the outbreak 
of the Troubles in late 1960s and early 1970s. Initially these groups were fragmented and 
diverse local responses to the threat from Irish republicans. As the conflict persisted and they 
became more structured, two major groupings began to dominate: the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). These groups were responsible 
for almost 1000 deaths during the Troubles and almost 100 since the loyalist ceasefire was 
called in 1994 (McAuley & Ferguson, 2016). Loyalist paramilitary groups are pro-British 
armed violent extremist groups, with loyalist violence perceived as ‘conservative,’ or ‘pro-
state’ (Bruce, 1992).  
Loyalist groups can also be considered as social movements given their role as a 
vehicle for working-class individuals to engage in collective political action, albeit, in many 
cases, violent action. Loyalist groups meet the criteria specified by Tilly (2004) to enable 
them to be classified as such: engagement in a sustained campaign of organized public effort 
making a collective claim to target authorities;  a repertoire of collective action (at times in 
conjunction with violent action) which involved the creation of special purpose associations 
and coalitions (across armed groups and with mainstream political actors), and the production 
of political ephemera and engagement with the media in support of their cause; and ‘WUNC’ 
(worthiness, unity, notwithstanding occasional internal contestation, numbers, and 
commitment) on the part of themselves and their constituencies. 
Whilst the conflict in Northern Ireland (and loyalism’s role within it) has been 
considered through a number of theoretical lenses (see e.g. McGarry & O’Leary 1993; 
Mitchell, 2011; Probert, 1978; Pruitt, 2007), few studies have explicitly explored the conflict 
and its transformation through the concept of structural violence. Such a perspective, we 
argue, provides illuminating new interpretations of how and why the conflict developed, and, 
ultimately, ended in the ways that it did.  
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This article aims to address some of these gaps in the literature by exploring 
individual accounts of how loyalist paramilitaries transformed from using political violence 
to achieve political change and began to use peaceful means to deal with structural violence 
in Northern Ireland. This transformation was part of the UDA, UVF, Red Hand Commando 
(RHC) organizational processes of conversion towards a non-military civilianized role as part 
of the wider peace process as outlined in the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement (the 
Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations, 1998) which are still 
ongoing (Alderdice, McBurney & Williams, 2016).  
The narrative accounts provided by current and former UDA/UVF/RHC combatants 
and members of their respective political wings in face-to face interviews were analysed 
through processes common to thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA;  Smith, 1995; 1996).  
Structural violence and Northern Ireland  
The concept of structural violence has proven highly influential and is much debated in the 
field of peace and conflict studies. Originally developed by Johan Galtung, it seeks to 
differentiate diverse forms of violence, and explain the presence of violence within a given 
context. Instead of conceptualising violence as a singular phenomenon, over the course of his 
career, Galtung differentiated between discrete manifestations of it (Galtung, 1969, 1990). 
These were direct, cultural, and structural violence.  
Direct violence pertained to actual physical threats to personal security: actual bodily 
harm, as well as violent utterance directed towards, and directly experienced by, an individual 
or group. This category of violence contains the types of event which we usually associate 
with violent conflict, such as war, murder (individual or mass killing), sexual violence, and 
assault. Direct violence, however, was only a symptom of wider underlying causes, which 
was fed and sustained by other forms of violence. Direct violence (excluding sexual violence 
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related to the conflict, which was extremely rare) was certainly a daily feature over the course 
of Northern Ireland’s conflict. Over 3,500 people were killed (McDaid, 2013; Wolff, 2006), 
with many more injured in bombings, shootings, and punishment attacks.1 The majority of 
the attacks were carried out by republican paramilitaries, with loyalists and the security forces 
making up the remainder (White, 1993).    
Cultural violence, on the other hand, does not produce injury by itself. However, it 
can produce, justify, or reinforce direct violence. Cultural violence can be understood as the 
collective or societal attitudes about the necessity for violence (Galtung, 1990). This could 
manifest, for example, as the glorification of martial culture, blood sacrifice, or armed 
struggle within a given community as part of its foundation myth. Some loyalist 
paramilitaries look to the sacrifice of the Ulster Volunteer Force at the Battle of the Somme 
in 1916 to legitimise their armed campaign to defend Ulster’s place in the United Kingdom 
(see e.g. Brown, 2007; Brown & Grant, 2016). Republicans, also look back to 1916, 
glorifying the sacrifice made during the Easter Rebellion of that year. This sanctification of 
blood sacrifice in both loyalist and republican collective memory has persisted even after the 
direct violence of the conflict has largely been brought under control (Ferguson & McAuley, 
2016).  
Perhaps the most influential aspect of Galtung’s theory pertains to structural violence. 
Structural violence (or ‘social injustice’) can be understood as a form of social structure, or 
social (or political) institution which can prevent people from attaining their basic needs or 
fulfilling their potential (Galtung, 1969). It can take many forms, including intentional 
deprivation or social exclusion (e.g. Galtung, 1969; Miall, 2007). In other words, the violence 
is produced, and reproduced, within existing structures, fuelling direct violence and 
                                            
1 Punishment shootings or beatings are attacks in which paramilitaries shoot their victims, 
usually in the arms or legs or assault them with bats or cudgels.  
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legitimised by cultural forms of violence. In a Northern Ireland context, it can certainly be 
argued that such exclusion contributed to the outbreak of conflict.  
Prior to 1972, Northern Ireland was governed by a devolved legislature, the Northern 
Ireland Parliament. For fifty years, the Ulster Unionist Party was the governing party. It has 
been argued that Catholics and nationalists were precluded from control of local government 
in areas where they comprised a majority through the manipulation of electoral boundaries, 
restrictions in the local government franchise, and repressive security measures with the goal 
of ‘keeping Catholics in their place’ (Farrell, 1976; Mulholland, 2004). Structural violence, in 
the form of deprivation, was not confined to Catholics and nationalists, however. Often, 
loyalists, drawn overwhelmingly from working-class backgrounds suffered levels of 
economic deprivation comparable to their Catholic counterparts (McAuley, 2016).  
However, the presentation of their working class Catholic counterparts as a threat to 
the state itself precluded the development of class politics in the region. Nevertheless, as 
former loyalist paramilitaries have themselves pointed out, poorer Protestants were prepared 
to take up arms in defence of the state regardless of what (perceived) material advantages it 
brought them (Ferguson & McAuley, 2017).  
These experiences of conflict, structural violence and building peace at the interfaces 
between Catholic and Protestant communities living ‘cheek by jowl’ with each other provide 
the context for grassroots peace building in Northern Ireland, a context which is highly suited 
to the application of Lederach’s (1995) conception of conflict transformation. The 
experiences of loyalist paramilitaries moving from armed violence to conflict transformation 
activities also shares connections to recent work on the disengagement and de-radicalization 
of violent extremists (Barrelle, 2015; Bjørgo, 2009). How loyalist collective action, through 
engagement in a peace process, disarming, and peacebuilding, transformed social and 
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political life in Northern Ireland will now be examined through individual accounts of this 
activity.   
Method 
Participants 
The 15 participants in this study were adult males, all of whom were members or former 
members of the UDA (n = 1), the UVF (n=10) or the RHC (n=4). Most of the sample (n =12) 
had been imprisoned during the Troubles for politically motivated violence. The interviews 
were conducted between 2005 and 2015. All participants were opportunity sampled via 
various political and community organizations in Northern Ireland. The leadership of the 
above groups committed these movements to the peace process, so the sample contained 
those who had made a personal journey from conflict to peace. However, the participants 
were not approached based on any distinctive personal or political characteristic, outside of 
having been a former member of one of the above-named groups and willing to participate in 
a research interview. The study was not interested in those who actively supported or 
opposed the peace process, but the role played by former combatants in contributing to the 
post-conflict political dispensation in Northern Ireland.  
The research received prior ethical approval from the respective ethics committees 
from the universities which the authors are affiliated to. There were no significant barriers to 
gaining ethical approval, since ‘operational matters’ were not discussed with the former 
paramilitaries. The interviews were concerned with personal perspectives on loyalism and the 
peace process, not what those sampled did, or did not, do whilst involved in the conflict.   
Interview Procedure 
Two of the authors were involved in interviewing the participants. All interviews were 
digitally recorded and conducted in a location selected by the participant. Interviews lasted 
for 30 to 200 minutes and participants spoke for as long as they wished. The interviews were 
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semi-structured and designed to allow the participants to develop themes and lead the 
discussion. The interview normally started with an invitation to share their story and reflect 
upon their personal journey from their initial involvement in political activity, and political 
violence more specifically, through to their disengagement from violent paramilitary activity. 
The participants were then ‘funnelled’ (see Smith & Osborn, 2003) through flexible and 
focused semi-structured open questions and verbal and non-verbal nudges to produce 
additional detail. This approach builds rapport, keeps interviewer interference to a minimum 
and allows the participant to elucidate their story and experiences (see Ferguson, Burgess & 
Hollywood, 2010, for more detail on this interview and analysis process). All interviews were 
then transcribed verbatim. 
Data Analysis 
The qualitative data analysis conducted was based on principles common to IPA and thematic 
analysis (see Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 1995; Smith & Osborn, 2003). Within this 
approach, the detailed reviewing of each participant’s transcript builds and develops 
narratives which describe the experiences and perceptions of each individual participant 
(Smith & Osborn, 2003). After analysing each transcript in turn, the themes which were 
raised from each transcript are compared to determine themes which are shared by the 
participants. 
Results 
Five primary themes emerged from the interview transcripts, explored in detail below 
through extensive quotation from the sample. Whilst the quotations reflect the variations 
between and among individuals within the sample, the quotations chosen are broadly 
representative of the views expressed in the sample as a whole (constraints of space prevent 
are more detailed elucidation of the micro-variations present among responses within the 
sample).  
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Theme 1: Demythologizing the Troubles 
The main themes are illustrated with extracts from the participant’s transcripts. The first 
theme “demythologizing the Troubles” relates to cultural violence, and the attempts made by 
the participants to challenge the glorification of the Troubles and the maintenance of cultural 
violence after the peace process. Although almost 20 years have passed since the signing of 
the Belfast Agreement, the legacy of the Troubles still sustains cultural violence which 
facilitates recruitment to republican and loyalist paramilitary groups, sectarian and political 
protests and obstructs political accommodation and conflict transformation (MacGinty, 
Muldoon & Ferguson, 2007).  
These participants were involved in trying to challenge this cultural violence through 
educational and restorative justice projects by demythologizing the glorification of the 
Troubles and violence taking place in their communities: 
We were talking about the conflict days [with a group of young men in a community 
group]… and one of them or two or three of them eventually said “I would love to 
live in those days”, and I just lost it. I said “do you have any idea, you know it seems 
glamorous now”, I said “but wait till you’re carrying a coffin of your mother and 
father dead in the street, or you’re carrying a coffin of your wife or your brother, or 
your best mate down the street”, and it’s getting this message through that it wasn’t 
glamorous, it wasn’t nice, it was ugly, it was rotten, and it’s people like myself and 
others, we have to get this message out to the younger generation, that it wasn’t 
glamorous. You know it’s easy sticking up murals glorifying [the violence of the 
past], but it wasn’t [glorious], you know, which is why we are trying to get rid of 
them and replace them with other stuff. By constantly glamorising you are attracting, 
and filling the minds of the kids with crap, and it’s only people who, like myself, who 
came through it and who were involved in the conflict and carried the coffins of their 
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mates and seen the atrocities who can make them see the horror of the conflict. 
(Participant 7, Belfast, 2008) 
Paradoxically the participants felt that it was the ‘macho kudos’ of having been a purveyor of 
violence which gave them the credibility needed to sell this counter-radicalizing narrative to 
young people and provide a robust challenge to the legacy of cultural violence.  
Theme 2: Stopping the Violence 
The second theme of “stopping the violence” illustrates attempts to move away from direct 
violence and the barriers facing those involved in conflict transformation by lingering 
structural violence within the working class Protestant communities. The participants 
therefore strove to leave violence behind and build peace after 30 years of conflict:  
I wanted to end the war you know…so I was happy to either have the political role, 
community role, or a paramilitary role, as long as all three were married in together 
and all going in the same direction, and the basic direction, you know one was peace, 
two was to give the community the confidence, sort of stand on their own two feet. 
(Participant 3, Belfast, 2008) 
For others a key motivator for dismantling the culture of violence was so their children or the 
children of Northern Ireland more generally did not have to endure violence like they did: 
I just look at my kids. I would dread them to have the upbringing, come through what 
I did. I don’t want that for them. I don’t want them to live the fear, always looking 
over their shoulders, always looking over their back, can’t go in to certain areas and 
carrying the coffins of their friends, and relatives and stuff, I don’t want that for them.  
I want a better society for them, so I do, and that’s what motivates us. It motivates a 
lot of us who have been there and done it. (Participant 1, Belfast, 2008) 
However, they felt hindered by the remaining legacy of cultural violence which led to 
demands from members of the wider community for them to return to violence to deal with 
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problems such as anti-social behaviour within the community or what the community viewed 
as an existential threat: 
There was a couple of incidents after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement 
where respectable, what they would call respectable unionists, two women and a man 
probably in their 60s who came to where we were standing as Gerry Adams [leader of 
Sinn Féin] was being interviewed by one of the TV stations. And we were standing 
there and they came round…and they said “shame on youse, ‘coz you’re with the 
PUP’s” [Progressive Unionist Party, linked to UVF and RHC]. I said “what?” They 
said “in the old days the UVF wouldn’t have let them stand over there. They’d have 
sorted them out”.  (Participant 3, Belfast, 2008) 
Theme 3: Organizational Pressures to Maintain 
In addition to the pressures from outside the organization to remain engaged in violence as 
discussed above, the third theme “organizational pressures to maintain” describes how 
organizational discord, the clandestine nature of these illegal armed groups and a lack of 
positive political leadership within loyalist communities makes the transformation away from 
the use of politically motivated violence difficult. Most participants likened these difficulties 
to the ‘turning of a tanker’: 
The tragedy is that for 30 years the popular loyalist paramilitaries have controlled 
these areas and breaking that is not going to happen overnight, and it is something 
which we have worked and worked and worked towards. To try to bring 
paramilitarism from conflict and into community activism. (Participant 1, Belfast, 
2008) 
A perceived lack of leadership within loyalism was deemed as a contributing factor to the 
difficulties in moving loyalists away from violence and dealing with structural violence in 
working class Protestant communities. A former loyalist paramilitary integral to the 
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negotiation of the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) ceasefire in October 1994 
discusses how the leadership within loyalism has depreciated and this stalls movement 
towards conflict transformation: 
I just had flashbacks to the day we declared the ceasefire and that day the world’s 
media was there. Satellite dishes, thousands, everybody, and that’s where loyalism 
was then. And I walked up on Sunday [to Fernhill House, site of the CLMC ceasefire 
statement] and it was quiet and I was saying to myself, you know where have I gone 
wrong? What’s happened? Because now we’re in a worse position. The UDP [Ulster 
Democratic Party] has collapsed so the UDA haven’t got no voice. We have gangsters 
flauntingly running about you know.  So where’s leadership and loyalism going now? 
(Participant 10, Belfast, 2005) 
These barriers were also reinforced by pressures to maintain the coherence and integrity of 
the organizations against splits and moves into criminality by the membership who faced an 
uncertain future: 
Since 1994 when the ceasefire was called, it’s “what do you do now mate, we’re 
redundant aren’t we?”… How do paramilitaries justify their existence if there’s no 
conflict? Yes, we’ve tried to move and alter culture, trying to get people involved in 
the community, trying to get people involved in politics. (Participant 5, Belfast, 2007) 
In this way, those pushing for a peaceful transition faced pressures which might have resulted 
in more direct violence, and a linked threat of criminal activity that contributed to structural 
violence and inequality within their areas.  
Theme 4: Activist Identity 
Theme four “activist identity” illustrates the role of identity and commitment to the cause in 
maintaining the transformation into non-violence, not some ‘deradicalization’ process which 
weakened identity and ideology. As within other social movements, identification was key to 
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the participants’ involvement in both military and peaceful activities (Huddy, 2001; 
Klandermans, 2002; Louis, Amiot, Thomas & Blackwood, 2016): 
I have no hesitation in saying I’m still very much into loyalist politics, that’s my 
identity and culture and it’s where I come from. (Participant 6, Belfast, 2015) 
What they don’t realise is that there are people like me who gave their liberty in 
defence of their community, rightly or wrongly, and it would be very silly for me to 
spend 16 years in jail and to leave it at that and not come out and want to try and give 
something back to the community. (Participant 4, Belfast, 2005) 
In addition to this strong sense of identity, the participants indicated a high level of 
commitment as illustrated by this former UVF member: 
You know, the other thing is I’m a single parent with three kids. People say to me ‘coz 
you’ve brought the kids up on your own you’ve done this, for the last I think 7 years 
I’ve been a single parent. They say you’re a good dad, I say no I’m not because at each 
point over the last few years I’ve been willing to go to jail, I’ve been willing to die and 
leave my children. Such is the strength of my conviction.  (Participant 3, Belfast, 2008) 
These strong bonds of identity and commitment amongst the participants were still as key to 
driving their conflict transformation work as their earlier political violence. So while there 
were clear behavioural changes, in that most were now working on building community 
capacity or were involved in community politics, ex-prisoner support groups, youth work and 
education initiatives, rather than engaging in politically motivated violence, they could not be 
considered to have become deradicalized or have weakened in their commitment or bonds of 
identity.  
Theme 5: “Through the Looking Glass” 
The fifth theme “through the looking glass” explores how the loyalists gauged their own 
transformation in light of how their republican adversaries in the Provisional Irish Republican 
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Army (IRA) and their political party Sinn Féin have managed their transformation to non-
violence. During the conflict loyalists firmly viewed the IRA as the enemy and republicans as 
a dangerous outgroup (McAuley & Ferguson, 2016). However, during the peace process 
these relationships have altered and, while still problematic, there was a degree of respect and 
veneration: 
You can’t fight an enemy and not start to admire [them] because the minute you start 
to take them for granted, you’re a dead man. I always held them in high esteem that 
way. I admire their commitment. (Participant 14, Mid-Ulster, 2007) 
It is positive in that you can engage with them and you can talk to them … they have 
an affinity with working-class issues, they can recognise the common issues between 
Protestants and Catholics. But they are no more positive than what the progressive 
thinking within loyalism is. I mean they have their red necks; they have their 
sectarianism. (Participant 13, Belfast, 2006) 
In particular, there was admiration for how Sinn Féin and the IRA had been able to bring the 
vast majority of their members with them and gain vast electoral support amongst the 
nationalist electorate in a way loyalists were unable to do: 
Nearly in every nationalist area that you go into you will find that the community 
workers are members of Sinn Féin, because they’ve seen that was the way forward, 
that was the way of developing the community, but also developing their image as 
well. So they’re getting benefits both ways. The community’s benefiting, and them as 
a political party is benefiting. Their workers are benefiting because they’ve got jobs, 
so the whole lot is benefiting. I mean if you look on our side what do you see? 
(Participant 8, Belfast, 2007) 
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The following quotation is representative of the beliefs of many of the participants who were 
interviewed for this study, who believed that the republican model was one to replicate in 
order to transform working class Protestant communities away from structural violence: 
I don’t like doing it, but we need to learn from what they [the IRA and Sinn Féin] 
done, because they were the best. They were the best at it and we don’t have to look 
that far, because it’s just across the road from us, wherever you are in Belfast. And 
you can learn from them and I know a lot of people say “oh, we are always second 
fiddle, we’re always learning, we’re always doing things from them” and you know 
watching them and following them. Well that’s the nature of it. That’s the way we are. 
If we see ourselves, if you see yourselves as counter-terrorists, which they like to be 
called, then you are always going to be following.  (Participant 9, Belfast, 2007).  
The emphasis on the local dimension is interesting, and the lessons that loyalists and 
republicans can learn (or have learned) from each other have arguably been underplayed in 
the existing literature. It may be that loyalists and republicans have as much to teach each 
other as they have those engaging in conflict transformation initiatives elsewhere in the world 
(compare O’Kane, 2010). Nevertheless, challenges to more open engagement between 
loyalists and republicans remain, such as the residual fear and hostilities between the two 
communities, despite a willingness to work together for the sake of peace (Shirlow, Tonge, 
McAuley & McGlynn, 2010).  
Discussion 
The loyalists’ journey from conflict to relative peace has involved a struggle to tackle not 
only direct violence, but the cultural and structural violence that underpinned it. The potential 
for groups to drift from direct paramilitary violence into criminality, which would in turn 
exacerbate structural violence within loyalist communities, merely reinforces the challenges 
faced by loyalist actors in the context of conflict transition. The themes identified in this 
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article drawn from the case of Northern Ireland reinforce Galtung’s (1969; 1990) 
conceptualisation of the triangular relationship between different types of violence – 
structural, cultural and direct – which had a distinct influence on how the conflict developed 
in the ways that it did, and, consequently, impacted on the ways loyalists sought to bring it to 
an end.  
This article has identified five of the key challenges which former loyalist activists 
have claimed were crucial to cementing peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. These are: 
demythologising the conflict, thereby attempting to provide a credible narrative to counter 
violent extremism among a new generation in their community; stopping direct violence, 
which was particularly difficult given the cultural violence which legitimized it within the 
community; resisting organisational pressure to maintain violent action, a further legacy of 
cultural violence which also risked further structural violence in the form of criminality 
within loyalist areas; development of robust activist identity which was crucial in preventing 
recidivism; and the measurement of progress through reference to the parallel conflict 
transformation journey of their former republican enemies, without any watering down of 
their own activist identity, or any reduction in suspicions about the ‘other’ community. 
However, whilst suspicion of the other community has not necessarily waned, our 
research shows that loyalists have begun to think of their former enemies in new ways, up to 
and including a willingness to learn how republicans have benefitted from the peace process 
in ways which they perceive their own communities have not, thereby identifying ways to 
address the economic imbalances and structural violence which besets their locales and the 
working class population of Northern Ireland more generally (Jeong, 1999). This changing or 
challenging of discourse around their former opponents suggests that conflict transformation, 
rather than simply regulation, is a factor, and that loyalists can have an important role to play 
in furthering a transformative agenda (Lederach, 1995; Miall, 2007).   
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The experience of loyalist groups chimes with the broader literature on how terrorist 
campaigns do (or do not) end (Barrelle, 2015; Bjørgo, 2009). Our article confirms that 
desistence from political violence is rarely instant or linear – as the experience of other 
groups who have operated in Ireland also suggests. For example, the Official Irish 
Republican Army (OIRA), a Marxist-Leninist vanguard movement, took over two decades, 
and several political transformations, to move away from paramilitarism, during which time it 
engaged in extensive criminality (Rekawek, 2008). But it does demonstrate that when 
paramilitary groups do engage in negotiated transitions, some measure of (qualified) success 
is a likely outcome (Cronin, 2009).  
As a major challenge facing former combatants is being drawn into criminality and 
thus maintaining the cultures of violence; developing support with the reintegration of former 
fighters back into civil society is vital. Clearly to enable this will involve providing secure 
employment and tailored educational and training programmes (Bertram, 2015), and this 
should be considered an essential part of any post-conflict settlement or deradicalization 
programme.   
The experience of loyalists in Northern Ireland further suggests the importance of 
credibility and a strong sense of activist identity in countering violent extremism, and 
providing a persuasive counter-narrative to those who advocate violence – an especially 
challenging proposition given the cultural violence which has celebrated historical instances 
of armed struggle within the community. This has potential transferability outside an Irish 
setting. Neumann (2015), for example, argues that former members of the Islamic State (IS) 
organisation could be extremely effective in preventing new recruits joining the group, due to 
their perceived credibility and first-hand knowledge of the society IS seek to create.  
This also has important implications for the current debates on the effectiveness of 
counter-narratives in combating recruitment to violent extremist groups (McDowell-Smith, 
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Speckhard & Yayla, 2017) and about the necessity of deradicalizing former combatants 
(Clubb, 2015) and indicates that the deradicalization of violent extremists may be impractical, 
unnecessary and potentially even counterproductive for counter-radicalization. Research on 
former ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) separatists from the Basque Country supports the 
notion that it is possible to disengage from violence without necessarily disavowing the 
legitimacy of past violence (Reinares, 2011). This is echoed in research on the reintegration 
of jihadist extremists conducted in a Dutch context, which emphasises that ‘disengagement 
alone may be able to prevent recidivism among extremists’ (Schuurman and Bakker, p. 78). 
Thus the findings in this article complement those in other national contexts, and contribute 
to a wider debate about the ultimate utility of deradicalization initiatives.   
Many interviewees spoke about how working for peace was harder, and more 
thankless than engaging in violence. Thus, a strong sense of identity and commitment to the 
in-group, coupled with a similarly strong belief in the justification of the reasons 
underpinning their prior involvement in conflict, can be crucial in preventing an individual or 
group making what might be the potentially easier choice of returning to the path of violence 
or moving into criminality. It may be fruitful for policymakers involved in peacebuilding 
initiatives to reflect on how such ‘extremist’ identities can be understood, developed and 
mobilised in positive ways during the transition from violence to peace, rather than trying to 
moderate or dismantle them. Indeed, as Lederach (1997) illustrates without post-conflict 
encounters which acknowledge the deep rooted identities and perceptions of the differing 
parties to conflict, you cannot move towards reconciliation.  
While most of the transformative activity undertaken by loyalist combatants and 
former combatants is self-directed and bottom-up (Shirlow, et al., 2010) it would be asking a 
lot of former paramilitaries and activists on their own to completely eradicate the different 
forms of violence that plagued their communities for many decades. Furthermore, residual 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
20 
 
challenges, in the form of group reorientation (Cronin, 2009) from political violence to 
organised crime still remains a challenge (Alderdice, McBurney & Williams, 2016). Clearly, 
to meet these challenges and tackle structural violence requires considerable investment and 
attention from the state authorities as well as these grassroots approaches.  
However, the recent multiparty accommodations (Northern Ireland Office, 2015) 
around the legacy of the Troubles left many questions unanswered and provided no clear 
proposals to deal with past violence or the legacy of the conflict, illustrating the problems 
faced by the devolved government in tackling these issues even 20 years after the Agreement. 
Indeed, structural violence in the form of inequality of opportunity, deprivation and poverty 
may never be completely eradicated. Nevertheless, in addressing the five key challenges 
identified in this article, loyalists have played a crucial role in ensuring that the direct 
violence which can often stem from structural violence is no longer an inevitable outcome.  
References 
Alderdice, Lord J., McBurney, J., & McWilliams, M. (2016) The Fresh Start panel report on 
the disbandment of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Northern Ireland 
Executive.    
Barrelle, K. (2015). Pro-integration: Disengagement from and life after extremism. Behavioral 
Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 7, 129-142.  
Bjørgo, T. (2009). Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right. In T. 
Bjørgo and J. Horgan (Eds.) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective 
Disengagement (pp. 30-48). London: Routledge. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3, 77-101. 
Bertram, L. (2015). How could a terrorist be de-radicalized. Journal for Deradicalization, 
15/16, 120-149. 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
21 
 
Brown, K. (2007). ‘Our father organization’: The cult of the Somme and the Unionist ‘golden 
age’ in modern Ulster loyalist commemoration, The Round Table – The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs, 96, 707 – 723. 
Brown, K., & Grant, A. (2016). A lens over conflicted memory: Surveying ‘troubles’ 
commemoration in Northern Ireland, Irish Political Studies 31, 139-162.  
Bruce, S. (1992). The red hand: Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Clancy, M. A. C. (2010). Peace without consensus: Power-sharing politics in Northern 
Ireland. London: Routledge.  
Clubb, G. (2015). De-radicalization, disengagement and the attitudes-behavior debate. In C. 
Kennedy-Pipe, G. Clubb and S. Mabon (eds.), Terrorism and Political Violence (pp. 
258-266). London: Sage. 
Cronin, A. K. (2009). How terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist 
campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cusack, J. & McDonald, H. (1997). UVF. Dublin: Poolbeg Press.   
English, R. (2003). Armed struggle: A history of the IRA. London: Pan Macmillan.  
Farrell, M. (1976). Northern Ireland: The orange state. London: Pluto. 
Ferguson, N., Burgess, M., & Hollywood, I. (2010). Who are the Victims? Victimhood 
Experiences in Post Agreement Northern Ireland. Political Psychology, 31, 857-886. 
Ferguson, N., & McAuley, J. W. (2016). An interview with Billy Hutchinson. Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 28, 636-652. 
Ferguson N., & McAuley, J. W. (2017). Ulster loyalist accounts of armed mobilization, 
demobilization and decommissioning. In L. Bosi and G. De Fazio (eds.) The 
Troubles: Northern Ireland and social movements Theories (pp. 111-128). 
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press. 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
22 
 
Galtung, J. (1990) Cultural violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27, pp. 291-305 
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of peace research, 6, 167-
191. 
Hennessey, T. (2000). The Northern Ireland peace process: Ending the troubles? Dublin: 
Gill and Macmillan. 
Jeong, H.W. (1999) Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Klandermans, B. (2002). How group identification helps to overcome the dilemma of 
collective action. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 887–900. 
Lederach, J.P. (1995) Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building Peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. 
Washington, DC: USIP Press 
Louis, W. R., Amiot, C. E., Thomas, E. F., & Blackwood, L. (2016). The “Activist identity” 
and activism across domains: A multiple identities analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 
72, 242-263. 
MacGinty, R., Muldoon, O. Ferguson, N. (2007). No war, no peace: Northern Ireland after 
the Agreement. Political Psychology, 28, 1-12. 
McAuley, J. W. (2010). Ulster's last stand? (Re) constructing Ulster Unionism after the 
peace process. Dublin: Irish Academic Press. 
McAuley, J. W. (2016). Very British Rebels? The Culture and Politics of Ulster Loyalism. 
New York: Bloomsbury.  
McAuley, J. W., & Ferguson, N. (2016). ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Ulster loyalist perspectives on the 
IRA and Irish Republicanism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 28, 561-575. 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
23 
 
McAuley, J. W., Tonge, J. & Mycock, A. (2011). Loyal to the core? Orangeism and 
Britishness in Northern Ireland. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.  
McDaid, S. (2013). Template for Peace: Northern Ireland, 1972-75. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.  
McDonald, H. & Cusack, J. (2004). The UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror. Dublin: 
Penguin Ireland.  
McDowell-Smith, A., Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2017). Beating ISIS in the digital 
space: Focus testing ISIS defector counter-narrative videos with American college 
students. Journal for Deradicalization, 10, 50-76. 
Miall, H. (2007). Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mitchell, A. (2011). Lost in transformation: violent peace and peaceful conflict in Northern 
Ireland. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mulholland, M. (2004). Why did Unionists discriminate? In S. Wichert, (Ed.) From the 
United Irishmen to twentieth-century unionism: essays in honour of ATQ Stewart (pp. 
187-206). Dublin: Four Courts Press.  
Neumann, P. R. (2015). Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State 
Defectors. (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political 
Violence).  
Northern Ireland Office (2015) A Fresh Start: The Stormont agreement and implementation 
plan. London: HMSO.  
O'Kane, E. (2010). Learning from Northern Ireland? The uses and abuses of the Irish 
‘model’. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 12, 239-256. 
O'Leary, B., & McGarry, J. (1993). The politics of antagonism: Understanding Northern 
Ireland. London: Athlone Press. 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
24 
 
Probert, B. (1978). Beyond orange and green: The political economy of the Northern Ireland 
crisis. London: Zed Press. 
Reinares, F. (2011). Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement 
and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA, Terrorism and Political Violence, 23, 
780-803 
Rekawek, K. E. (2008). How ‘terrorism’ does not end: the case of the Official Irish 
Republican Army. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1, 359-376. 
Rekawek, K. (2011). Irish republican terrorism and politics: A comparative study of the 
Official and the Provisional IRA. London: Routledge. 
Pruitt, D. G. (2007). Readiness theory and the Northern Ireland conflict. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 50, 1520-1541. 
Schuurman, B. & Bakker, E. (2016). Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch 
initiative, 2013-14. Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8, 
66-85.  
Shirlow, P., Tonge, J., & McAuley, J. W., & McGlynn, C. (2010). Abandoning historical 
conflict? Former political prisoners and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Smith, J. A. (1995). Semi-structured interviewing and qualitative analysis. In J. A. Smith, R. 
Harré, & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), Rethinking methods in psychology (pp. 9-26). 
London: Sage. 
Smith, J. A. (1996). Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: Using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis in health psychology. Psychology and Health, 11, 261-
271.  
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
25 
 
Smith, J. & Osborn, M. (2003). Interpretive phenomenological analysis. In J.A. Smith (Ed.) 
Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods (pp.51-80). London: 
Sage. 
Smithey, L. A. (2011). Unionists, loyalists, and conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
The Agreement: The agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations. (1998). Belfast: 
HMSO.  
Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 
Tonge, J. (2002). Northern Ireland: conflict and change. Cambridge: Pearson. 
White, R. W. (1993). On measuring political violence: Northern Ireland, 1969 to 
1980. American Sociological Review, 575-585. 
Wolff, S. (2006). Ethnic conflict: A global perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
